מתוך Moral Tribes, ספר שבוחן סיבות לערכים שונים בין חברות ומציע כלים לגישור. יצא שקראתי את זה ממש בעת השריפה בחיפה.
The Public Goods Game is, once again, the laboratory version of the Tragedy of the Commons. Individuals can contribute to a common pool, which gets multiplied by the experimenter and then
divided evenly among all players. Individuals maximize their payoffs by not contributing (free riding), but groups maximize their payoffs by fully contributing.
...
More recently, Benedikt Herrmann and colleagues have examined cooperation and punishment in a set of large-scale societies, and the results are equally striking. People in cities around the world played repeated Public Goods Games in which players could punish free riders
...
First, you’ll notice that, right from the start, people in different cities contribute at very different levels, with people in Athens, Riyadh, and Istanbul contributing a little over 25 percent of their allotments on average and people in Boston, Copenhagen, and St. Gallen contributing more than 75 percent. Second, there are roughly three different patterns concerning how the games play out over time. In places like Copenhagen, contributions start out high and stay high, because most people are willing to cooperate initially and because people will pay to punish the few who aren’t. (Even in places like Copenhagen, however, cooperation unravels over time if there’s no opportunity to punish.) And then there are places like Seoul, where contributions start out moderately high and then rise up to very high levels as free riders get reined in by punishment.
Finally, there are place like Athens, Riyadh, and Istanbul, where contributions start low and stay low. This last set of results is surprising: Given that cooperators in these places can punish the free riders, why doesn’t cooperation ramp up over time the way it does in Seoul?
It turns out that in places like Athens, Riyadh, and Istanbul, there is an opposing social force. In this version of the Public Goods Game,
cooperators can punish free riders, but free riders can also punish cooperators, a phenomenon known as “antisocial punishment.” In places like Athens, people who didn’t contribute to the common pool
often paid to punish those who did. Why would anyone do that? In part, it’s about revenge. Free riders resent being punished by cooperators and strike back. But it can’t be about revenge only
because, in some places, low contributors will punish cooperators on the first round! It’s as if they are saying, “To hell with you do-gooders! Don’t even think about trying to make me play your little
game!” As shown in figure 3.2, the prevalence of antisocial punishment is an excellent predictor of a group’s failure to cooperate.
divided evenly among all players. Individuals maximize their payoffs by not contributing (free riding), but groups maximize their payoffs by fully contributing.
...
More recently, Benedikt Herrmann and colleagues have examined cooperation and punishment in a set of large-scale societies, and the results are equally striking. People in cities around the world played repeated Public Goods Games in which players could punish free riders
...
First, you’ll notice that, right from the start, people in different cities contribute at very different levels, with people in Athens, Riyadh, and Istanbul contributing a little over 25 percent of their allotments on average and people in Boston, Copenhagen, and St. Gallen contributing more than 75 percent. Second, there are roughly three different patterns concerning how the games play out over time. In places like Copenhagen, contributions start out high and stay high, because most people are willing to cooperate initially and because people will pay to punish the few who aren’t. (Even in places like Copenhagen, however, cooperation unravels over time if there’s no opportunity to punish.) And then there are places like Seoul, where contributions start out moderately high and then rise up to very high levels as free riders get reined in by punishment.
Finally, there are place like Athens, Riyadh, and Istanbul, where contributions start low and stay low. This last set of results is surprising: Given that cooperators in these places can punish the free riders, why doesn’t cooperation ramp up over time the way it does in Seoul?
It turns out that in places like Athens, Riyadh, and Istanbul, there is an opposing social force. In this version of the Public Goods Game,
cooperators can punish free riders, but free riders can also punish cooperators, a phenomenon known as “antisocial punishment.” In places like Athens, people who didn’t contribute to the common pool
often paid to punish those who did. Why would anyone do that? In part, it’s about revenge. Free riders resent being punished by cooperators and strike back. But it can’t be about revenge only
because, in some places, low contributors will punish cooperators on the first round! It’s as if they are saying, “To hell with you do-gooders! Don’t even think about trying to make me play your little
game!” As shown in figure 3.2, the prevalence of antisocial punishment is an excellent predictor of a group’s failure to cooperate.
עכשיו, איני יודע אם הייתה סוכנות אנשית בכלל, או ערבית בפרט, בשריפות האחרונות. מה שאני יודע הוא שקיימים הבדלים ערכיים תרבותיים, ושהתרבות המתקיימת בין אתונה, ריאד ואיסטנבול היא אכן בעייתית בהרבה בכל הנוגע להכרה בטוב משותף ופעולה למענו, וחשוב יותר - אם נעצום את העיניים להבדלים מעין אלה ונסתום את פיהם של המביאים אותם בטענות הנכונות והלא שייכות כי כל האנשים אחים, כי על כל האנשים להיות שווים בזכויותיהם וכי קיימים הרבה אנשים מכל הסוגים בכל עם ועם, נמצא את עצמנו עם תאום בנצי גופשטיין בתפקיד שר הפנים תוך עשור.
מה עושים? איך מגשרים על הפער ובונים תרבות מכילה ובת קיימא במרחב? כל אלה שאלות מאד טובות. אם נציב אותן, ייתכן שנמצא תשובה.
(Before moving on, let me say that my intention here—in this chapter and elsewhere—is not to pick on Greeks or the members of any other nation or tribe. Instead, my hope is that we can learn from
the successes and failures of different social systems—systems for which few individuals bear any significant responsibility. To learn these lessons, however, we must be willing to say things that could be interpreted as insulting and that may sound distressingly similar to the things people say when they are airing their prejudices.***)
the successes and failures of different social systems—systems for which few individuals bear any significant responsibility. To learn these lessons, however, we must be willing to say things that could be interpreted as insulting and that may sound distressingly similar to the things people say when they are airing their prejudices.***)
